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DLD-029                    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3089 
___________ 
 
KARL B. MANUEL, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SERGEANT ATKINS, as employee at Sussex Violation of Probation Center (SVOP); 
JOHN DOE, name unknown of a supervisor at the Delaware Department of 
Transportation; JANE DOE, name unknown of a nurse employee or contractor at Sussex 
Violation of Probation Center, Correctional Medical Services, Inc.; WARDEN 
WILLIAM OETTEL, as employee at Sussex Violation of Probation Center (SVOP); 
STATE OF DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, (DELDOT); 
CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES, (“CMS”) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:10-cv-00962) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 31, 2013 
Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 05, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Karl B. Manuel appeals pro se from the District Court’s order granting a motion 
for summary judgment filed by Sergeant Adkins,
1
 Warden William Oettel, and the State 
of Delaware’s Department of Transportation (“DelDOT” and, together with Adkins and 
Oettel, the “Appellees”).  Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
 In November 2010 Manuel, a prisoner at Sussex Violation of Probation Center 
(“SVOP”) in Georgetown, Delaware, filed a pro se civil rights complaint in the District 
Court against Adkins, DelDOT employee John Doe, and Correctional Medical Services, 
Inc. (“CMS”) employee Jane Doe.  In April 2011 Manuel filed an amended complaint to 
assert additional claims against Oettel, and against DelDOT and CMS.  In October 2011, 
Manuel voluntarily dismissed CMS and Jane Doe. 
 In his amended complaint Manuel asserted that he and approximately 11 other 
prisoners were assigned to road crew duty to maintain the highways after a blizzard.  
Their work included cutting down trees and branches that were above power lines near 
the highway.  Manuel asserted that John Doe instructed him to work from the bed of a 
DelDOT truck and to use a pole saw to cut down branches.  Manuel further asserted that 
John Doe instructed another prisoner to cut down the tree that Manuel was working on, 
resulting in the tree falling onto the truck, pinning Manuel in the bed of the truck and 
knocking him unconscious.  Manuel asserted that Adkins and John Doe extricated him 
from the truck bed, despite his requests not to be moved, and took him back to SVOP to 
                                              
1
 The correct spelling of the appellee’s name appears to be Adkins. 
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be seen by CMS.  Manuel further claims that, due to his filing a grievance based upon his 
mistreatment, he was transferred from SVOP, a level four facility, to Sussex Correctional 
Institute, a level five facility.  In his amended complaint, which explicitly invoked 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, Manuel asserted that Adkins and John Doe violated his Eighth 
Amendment rights when they exhibited deliberate indifference to his medical needs, and 
that Oettel violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him on account of 
the grievance.  Manuel also asserted negligence claims against John Doe and DelDOT, 
and a claim for gross negligence against Adkins based upon allegedly placing Manuel at 
risk during the highway maintenance.  
 In January 2013 the Appellees (on their own behalf and on behalf of John Doe) 
filed a motion for summary judgment.  Subsequently, Manuel filed a motion for summary 
judgment and a motion for an expert witness.  In June 2013 the District Court entered a 
memorandum and order granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denying  
Manuel’s motions as moot.  It concluded that the record did not demonstrate that Adkins 
knew of a substantial risk of serious harm and that transporting Manuel to CMS, which 
routinely handled inmate care, was not unreasonable.  The District Court further noted 
that Adkins did not delay or deny medical treatment.  The District Court also concluded 
that Adkins was not grossly negligent, as he did not consciously disregard a risk of 
serious harm from supervising the road crew. 
 As to Manuel’s First Amendment claim, the District Court noted that prisoners do 
not have due process rights to be incarcerated at a particular facility, and that the record 
did not support a finding that Manuel’s transfer was anything but routine.  Finally, the 
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District Court dismissed Manuel’s claims against John Doe for failure to substitute an 
individual for John Doe or to serve the complaint during the 120 day service period, and 
dismissed the claims against DelDOT based upon Eleventh Amendment immunity.  
Manuel timely appealed the District Court’s order.         
II. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a District 
Court’s orders granting a motion for summary judgment is plenary.  DeHart v. Horn, 390 
F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2004).  We must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Manuel and drawing all inferences in his favor, there was no 
genuine issue of material fact and the Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. 
 The District Court correctly granted the motion for summary judgment.  In order 
to set forth a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Adkins, Manuel needed to 
show that he had a serious medical need towards which Adkins was deliberately 
indifferent.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
2
  Adkins could be 
considered deliberately indifferent if he knew that Manuel faced a substantial risk of 
serious harm and if he failed to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm.  See Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994); Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 
                                              
2
 We assume without deciding that Manuel’s injuries constituted a serious medical need.  
Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 
1987).      
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2009).  Adkins could also have been considered deliberately indifferent if he delayed or 
denied Manuel medical care.  See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.  
 As noted by the District Court, nothing in the record established that Adkins knew 
of a substantial risk of harm to Manuel, or that his decision to transport Manuel to CMS 
was unreasonable under the circumstances.  Adkins did not deny or delay treatment and, 
while Manuel may have preferred treatment from someone other than CMS or a different 
type of treatment, he was not entitled to dictate the treatment he received.  See Harrison 
v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2000).
3
  As Adkins acted reasonably in 
transporting Manuel to CMS for medical treatment,
4
 we conclude that he was not 
deliberately indifferent to Manuel’s medical needs.  See Giles, 571 F.3d at 330 (“prison 
officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found 
free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk’) (citing Farmer 511 U.S. at 
844).     
                                              
3
 To the extent that Manuel questioned the treatment he received from Jane Doe and 
CMS, Adkins is not responsible.  Prison officials who are not physicians are entitled to 
defer to the medical judgment of staff physicians, and cannot be considered deliberately 
indifferent for failing to respond to an inmate’s medical needs where the inmate was 
already receiving treatment from the prison’s medical staff.  See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 
991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993).  As to Jane Doe and CMS, Manuel asserted that after 
being misdiagnosed by CMS, he was sent back to his cell and later became immobilized 
and was ultimately diagnosed with several herniated discs.  However, as Manuel 
voluntarily dismissed Jane Doe and CMS from this case, we need not address his medical 
treatment or whether Jane Doe or CMS were deliberately indifferent. 
4
 While transporting Manuel to CMS may not have been the best course of action in light 
of Manuel’s injuries, Manuel is not entitled to the best possible care so long as reasonable 
measures are taken to avoid substantial risk of serious harm.  See Forbes v. Edgar, 112 
F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).  
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 Manuel’s gross negligence claim against Adkins appears to be a Delaware state 
law claim, which the District Court had supplement jurisdiction over pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(a).  Manuel bases his claim on Adkins’ supervisory role over Manuel and 
the road crew that were cutting down the trees.  The Delaware Supreme Court has 
defined gross negligence as a higher level of negligence representing “an extreme 
departure from the ordinary standard of care.”  Browne v. Robb, 583 A.2d 949, 953 (Del. 
1990).
5
  However, nothing in the record suggested that Adkins made an extreme 
departure from the ordinary standard of care.  Rather, Manuel testified that Adkins was 
not supervising the actual work performed but was simply there to monitor the prisoners 
to ensure that they did not leave the area.  Manuel further asserted that he and the other 
inmates were following DelDOT’s orders, and that it was John Doe who instructed 
Manuel to work from the truck bed and who also instructed the other inmate to cut down 
the tree that ultimately injured Manuel.  Accordingly, there is nothing to support a finding 
that it was Adkins who departed from the applicable standard of care.  Accordingly, 
Adkins was entitled to summary judgment in his favor.
6
   
                                              
5
 Manuel must assert a gross negligence claim, as opposed to mere negligence, as the 
Delaware Tort Claims Act provides immunity to public officials if the act or omission 
complained of were done without gross or wanton negligence.  See Hanson v. Morton, 67 
A.3d 437, 441 (Del. 2013) (citing 10 Del. C. § 4001), 
6
 The District Court treated Manuel’s negligence claim as a substantive due process 
claim.  We understand the claim as a state-law claim brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1367.  To the extent that Manuel’s claim was a constitutional claim, Manuel needed to 
show that Adkins consciously disregarded a great risk that serious harm would result 
from his conduct.  See Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 66 n.6 (3d Cir. 
2002).  However, as under our state law gross negligence analysis, nothing in the record 
suggested that Adkins consciously disregarded a great risk of harm.  As Manuel was not 
supervising the actual work performed, nothing supports a finding that it was Adkins who 
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 As to Manuel’s retaliation claim against Oettel, Manuel needed to demonstrate 
that he was subject to an adverse action by Oettel on account of filing the grievance.  See 
Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (prisoner must prove that his 
engagement in protected activity was a substantial motivating factor for a state actor’s 
decision to take adverse action).  However, nothing in the record suggests that Oettel was 
aware of Manuel’s medical issues or his grievance, or that Oettel knew the reason 
Manuel was transferred.  Accordingly, the District Court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of Oettel. 
 Further, we agree with the District Court’s determination that DelDOT, as an 
agency of the State of Delaware, was entitled to immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment.  See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).  
Finally, the District Court properly dismissed all claims against John Doe, as Manuel 
failed to serve John Doe within the 120 day service period, and failed to discover the 
identity of John Doe despite being given the opportunity to do so.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. 
IV. 
 For these reasons, the District Court properly granted the motion for summary 
judgment.  Because this appeal presents us with no substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See 3rd Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
disregarded a great risk to Manuel.  Further, to the extent that Adkins was responsible for 
the work being done, there is no evidence that he consciously disregarded a great risk that 
the inmates under his care would be injured during their work, which had been performed 
all morning with no incidents. 
